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PREFACE
Back in the paleolithic era, when I was a law student, the eminent
professor who doggedly tried to teach me corporation law spent an inordinate amount of time on the doctrine of ultra vires. I learned, for
example, that a railroad could build and operate a resort hotel at the
end of its line on the remote and uninhabited seacoast of Florida; people
would ride the railroad in order to stay at the hotel, and so the hotel was
an incident to the corporation's proper business. On like reasoning, streetcar companies were allowed to run amusement parks, and many of them
did. On the other hand, a railroad could not underwrite a music festival;
that was a bit too far from railroading. There were hundreds and maybe
thousands of such cases, for the courts were determined to keep corporate
enterprise within bounds. Their policy was based in large part on the reasoning that stockholders and creditors had intended to invest their money
only in the particular business specified in the charter. But the courts
were probably also influenced by the fears which led legislatures, in the
days before general incorporation laws, strictly to confine the business in
which a newly created corporation could engage. A corporation was a
dangerous beast, capable not only of immortality but of indefinite growth,
a sort of genie in the bottle. If you let it expand into every business which
seemed profitable, it could easily strangle small and independent businesses
and perhaps grow stronger than the state itself. Strict limitation of the
size and nature of a corporation's business was, in effect, a primitive method
of dealing with the problems at which modern antitrust laws are aimed.
The genie could not be kept in the bottle. Even in the old days, corporate
managements and their lawyers were sometimes too clever for the legislatures. In 1799 the New York legislature chartered the Manhattan Company
(an ancestor of the Chase Manhattan Bank) as a water company. But its
incorporators slipped into the bill an inconspicuous clause which gave it
incidental power to employ its "surplus capital . . . in the purchase of

public or other stock, or in any other monied transactions or operations
not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of this State or of the
United States," and it has been a bank ever since. Modern general incorporation statutes permit corporations not only to hold the stock of other
companies but to include in their charters purpose clauses as broad as
desired. The typical purpose clause of an American corporation in 1970
permits it to engage in just about any business in which a reasonably
honest dollar is to be made.
And many of them do. A modern conglomerate may proliferate into
all sorts of apparently unrelated businesses. One fairly typical specimen
operates a railroad, a commercial finance company and grain elevators; it
produces, inter alia, yachts, sewage disposal systems, fraternal jewelry and
foundry equipment. Some corporations which are not generally thought
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of as conglomerates have diversified into lines which would startle their
founders. RCA rents automobiles, publishes books and sells frozen foods
and data processing systems. United States Steel, not exactly a go-go outfit, recently entered the business of leasing and selling executive aircraft.
Banks and railroads are eager to become holding companies. The motives
behind the urge to agglomerate are as varied as the businesses acquired
and the techniques of acquisition employed. Cigarette companies acquire
producers of cat food and candy because the future of the weed is clouded.
The Internal Revenue Code gives to corporations with negative earnings
records a strong incentive to pick up profitable businesses. Some of the
presiding geniuses of conglomerates seem to have Napoleon complexes.
Some sincerely believe that central financing and control of diverse enterprises promotes efficiency.
The rise of the conglomerate has, of course, aroused plenty of opposition. Executives of established businesses do not like being taken over, to
be moved to a strange city, or to be fired outright. They have developed
ingenious and more or less legitimate techniques to impede take-overs. The
SEC has been much concerned by the profusion of weird and wonderful
subordinated convertible debentures, etc., etc.securities -warrants,
which take-over bidders have offered to public stockholders and which may
contain the seeds of the most intricate reorganizations in bankruptcy since
the Homeric age of Insull and Hopson. Economists and lawyers hotly debate the antitrust questions raised by the growth of the voracious conglomerates. The Department of Justice and Congress have attempted to slow
that growth.
These and related problems are the subjects of the articles which
follow. Whether the conglomerate is a passing phenomenon of this decade,
like the utility holding company systems of the twenties, or is with us to
stay, it deserves the close attention of lawyers.
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